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Introduction to Computer Security
Introduction to Computer Security
Table of Contents
Copyright
Preface
Goals
Philosophy
Organization
Differences Between this Book and Computer Security: Art and Science
Special Acknowledgment
Acknowledgments
Chapter 1. An Overview of Computer Security
Section 1.1.  The Basic Components
Section 1.2.  Threats
Section 1.3.  Policy and Mechanism
Section 1.4.  Assumptions and Trust
Section 1.5.  Assurance
Section 1.6.  Operational Issues
Section 1.7.  Human Issues
Section 1.8.  Tying It All Together
Section 1.9.  Summary
Section 1.10.  Further Reading
Section 1.11.  Exercises
Chapter 2. Access Control Matrix
Section 2.1.  Protection State
Section 2.2.  Access Control Matrix Model
Section 2.3.  Protection State Transitions
Section 2.4.  Summary
Section 2.5.  Further Reading
Section 2.6.  Exercises
Chapter 3. Foundational Results
Section 3.1.  The General Question
Section 3.2.  Basic Results
Section 3.3.  Summary
Section 3.4.  Further Reading
Section 3.5.  Exercises
Chapter 4. Security Policies
Section 4.1.  Security Policies
Section 4.2.  Types of Security Policies
Section 4.3.  The Role of Trust
Section 4.4.  Types of Access Control
Section 4.5.  Example: Academic Computer Security Policy
Section 4.6.  Summary
Section 4.7.  Further Reading
Section 4.8.  Exercises
Chapter 5. Confidentiality Policies
Section 5.1.  Goals of Confidentiality Policies
Section 5.2.  The Bell-LaPadula Model
Section 5.3.  Summary
Section 5.4.  Further Reading
Section 5.5.  Exercises
Chapter 6. Integrity Policies
Section 6.1.  Goals
Section 6.2.  Biba Integrity Model
Section 6.3.  Clark-Wilson Integrity Model
Section 6.4.  Summary
Section 6.5.  Further Reading
Section 6.6.  Exercises
Chapter 7. Hybrid Policies
Section 7.1.  Chinese Wall Model
Section 7.2.  Clinical Information Systems Security Policy
Section 7.3.  Originator Controlled Access Control
Section 7.4.  Role-Based Access Control
Section 7.5.  Summary
Section 7.6.  Further Reading
Section 7.7.  Exercises
Chapter 8. Basic Cryptography
Section 8.1.  What Is Cryptography?
Section 8.2.  Classical Cryptosystems
Section 8.3.  Public Key Cryptography
Section 8.4.  Cryptographic Checksums
Section 8.5.  Summary
Section 8.6.  Further Reading
Section 8.7.  Exercises
Chapter 9. Key Management
Section 9.1.  Session and Interchange Keys
Section 9.2.  Key Exchange
Section 9.3.  Cryptographic Key Infrastructures
Section 9.4.  Storing and Revoking Keys
Section 9.5.  Digital Signatures
Section 9.6.  Summary
Section 9.7.  Further Reading
Section 9.8.  Exercises
Chapter 10. Cipher Techniques
Section 10.1.  Problems
Section 10.2.  Stream and Block Ciphers
Section 10.3.  Networks and Cryptography
Section 10.4.  Example Protocols
Section 10.5.  Summary
Section 10.6.  Further Reading
Section 10.7.  Exercises
Chapter 11. Authentication
Section 11.1.  Authentication Basics
Section 11.2.  Passwords
Section 11.3.  Challenge-Response
Section 11.4.  Biometrics
Section 11.5.  Location
Section 11.6.  Multiple Methods
Section 11.7.  Summary
Section 11.8.  Further Reading
Section 11.9.  Exercises
Chapter 12. Design Principles
Section 12.1.  Overview
Section 12.2.  Design Principles
Section 12.3.  Summary
Section 12.4.  Further Reading
Section 12.5.  Exercises
Chapte 13. Representing Identity
Section 13.1.  What Is Identity?
Section 13.2.  Files and Objects
Section 13.3.  Users
Section 13.4.  Groups and Roles
Section 13.5.  Naming and Certificates
Section 13.6.  Identity on the Web
Section 13.7.  Summary
Section 13.8.  Further Reading
Section 13.9.  Exercises
Chapter 14. Access Control Mechanisms
Section 14.1.  Access Control Lists
Section 14.2.  Capabilities
Section 14.3.  Locks and Keys
Section 14.4.  Ring-Based Access Control
Section 14.5.  Propagated Access Control Lists
Section 14.6.  Summary
Section 14.7.  Further Reading
Section 14.8.  Exercises
Chapter 15. Information Flow
Section 15.1.  Basics and Background
Section 15.2.  Compiler-Based Mechanisms
Section 15.3.  Execution-Based Mechanisms
Section 15.4.  Example Information Flow Controls
Section 15.5.  Summary
Section 15.6.  Further Reading
Section 15.7.  Exercises
Chapter 16. Confinement Problem
Section 16.1.  The Confinement Problem
Section 16.2.  Isolation
Section 16.3.  Covert Channels
Section 16.4.  Summary
Section 16.5.  Further Reading
Section 16.6.  Exercises
Chapter 17. Introduction to Assurance
Section 17.1.  Assurance and Trust
Section 17.2.  Building Secure and Trusted Systems
Section 17.3.  Building Security In or Adding Security Later
Section 17.4.  Summary
Section 17.5.  Further Reading
Section 17.6.  Exercises
Chapter 18. Evaluating Systems
Section 18.1.  Goals of Formal Evaluation
Section 18.2.  TCSEC: 19831999
Section 18.3.  FIPS 140: 1994Present
Section 18.4.  The Common Criteria: 1998Present
Section 18.5.  SSE-CMM: 1997Present
Section 18.6.  Summary
Section 18.7.  Further Reading
Section 18.8.  Exercises
Chapter 19. Malicious Logic
Section 19.1.  Introduction
Section 19.2.  Trojan Horses
Section 19.3.  Computer Viruses
Section 19.4.  Computer Worms
Section 19.5.  Other Forms of Malicious Logic
Section 19.6.  Defenses
Section 19.7.  Summary
Section 19.8.  Further Reading
Section 19.9.  Exercises
Chapter 20. Vulnerability Analysis
Section 20.1.  Introduction
Section 20.2.  Penetration Studies
Section 20.3.  Vulnerability Classification
Section 20.4.  Frameworks
Section 20.5.  Summary
Section 20.6.  Further Reading
Section 20.7.  Exercises
Chapter 21. Auditing
Section 21.1.  Definitions
Section 21.2.  Anatomy of an Auditing System
Section 21.3.  Designing an Auditing System
Section 21.4.  A Posteriori Design
Section 21.5.  Auditing Mechanisms
Section 21.6.  Examples: Auditing File Systems
Section 21.7.  Audit Browsing
Section 21.8.  Summary
Section 21.9.  Further Reading
Section 21.10.  Exercises
Chapter 22. Intrusion Detection
Section 22.1.  Principles
Section 22.2.  Basic Intrusion Detection
Section 22.3.  Models
Section 22.4.  Architecture
Section 22.5.  Organization of Intrusion Detection Systems
Section 22.6.  Intrusion Response
Section 22.7.  Summary
Section 22.8.  Further Reading
Section 22.9.  Exercises
Chapter 23. Network Security
Section 23.1.  Introduction
Section 23.2.  Policy Development
Section 23.3.  Network Organization
Section 23.4.  Availability and Network Flooding
Section 23.5.  Anticipating Attacks
Section 23.6.  Summary
Section 23.7.  Further Reading
Section 23.8.  Exercises
Chapter 24. System Security
Section 24.1.  Introduction
Section 24.2.  Policy
Section 24.3.  Networks
Section 24.4.  Users
Section 24.5.  Authentication
Section 24.6.  Processes
Section 24.7.  Files
Section 24.8.  Retrospective
Section 24.9.  Summary
Section 24.10.  Further Reading
Section 24.11.  Exercises
Chapter 25. User Security
Section 25.1.  Policy
Section 25.2.  Access
Section 25.3.  Files and Devices
Section 25.4.  Processes
Section 25.5.  Electronic Communications
Section 25.6.  Summary
Section 25.7.  Further Reading
Section 25.8.  Exercises
Chapter 26. Program Security
Section 26.1.  Introduction
Section 26.2.  Requirements and Policy
Section 26.3.  Design
Section 26.4.  Refinement and Implementation
Section 26.5.  Common Security-Related Programming Problems
Section 26.6.  Testing, Maintenance, and Operation
Section 26.7.  Distribution
Section 26.8.  Conclusion
Section 26.9.  Summary
Section 26.10.  Further Reading
Section 26.11.  Exercises
Chapter 27. Lattices
Section 27.1.  Basics
Section 27.2.  Lattices
Section 27.3.  Exercises
Chapter 28. The Extended Euclidean Algorithm
Section 28.1.  The Euclidean Algorithm
Section 28.2.  The Extended Euclidean Algorithm
Section 28.3.  Solving ax mod n = 1
Section 28.4.  Solving ax mod n = b
Section 28.5.  Exercises
Chapter 29. Virtual Machines
Section 29.1.  Virtual Machine Structure
Section 29.2.  Virtual Machine Monitor
Section 29.3.  Exercises
Bibliography
Index
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9.7. Further Reading

Ellison explores methods of binding an identity to a public key without using certificates [297].

The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol [599] deals with key exchange and authentication on the Internet. Several key exchange protocols are based on classical cryptosystems [146, 686]. Protocols based on public key methods abound (see, for example, [682, 705, 895, 951]).

Key generation is based on random numbers generated from physical phenomena [12, 234, 289, 307, 539, 740]. Generating keys pseudorandomly is tricky [711]; the most common method, using polynomial congruential generators, is not safe [128, 129, 532, 746]. Rabin [738] and Adleman, Pomerance, and Rumley [10] discuss generating large prime numbers for use in RSA; their method relies upon pseudorandom number generation.

Several papers discuss issues in public key infrastructure, including interoperation [451, 452, 761], organization [558, 579], requirements [37, 762], and models [207, 714]. Park and Sandhu [710] have proposed extensions for X.509v3 certificates. Adams and Lloyd [7] discuss many aspects of public key infrastructures.

Merkle [621] notes that certificates can be kept as data in a file. Changing any certificate changes the file. This reduces the problem of substituting faked certificates to a data integrity problem.

Key escrowing allows the recovery of data if the cryptographic key is not accessible. The best known such system is the U.S. government's Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) [116, 251, 665, 667, 678] Beth, Knobloch, Otten, Simmons, and Wichmann [86] identify five desirable properties of such a system; Ganesan [346] developed Yaksha, which meets all of these. Denning and Branstad [246] discuss the architecture of key escrow systems.

Several key escrow schemes explore different ways to control access. Burmester et al. [145] present a protocol with a limited time span. Several authors discuss the nontechnical aspects of the proposed U.S. key escrow system (for example, see [628, 794, 866]). Clark [176] and Walker et al. [929] discuss the relationship between key recovery and key escrow. Others have proposed enhancements and extensions of various Internet protocols for key recovery [53, 593, 798].

Translucent cryptography [66, 67] allows some fraction of the messages to be read. This is not a key escrow system, because the keys are not available, but it does serve the ends of such a system in that the messages can be read with a specified probability.

Digital signature protocols abound. One standard, the DSS [666], uses a variant of El Gamal [294]; Rivest and others have criticized some of its features [755]. Others, especially those associated with the ITU's X.500 series of recommendations, recommend (but do not require) RSA. Grant's book [372] discusses digital signatures in general and presents many case studies.

The electronic commerce protocol SET [812, 813, 814] uses dual digital signatures to tie components of messages together in such a way that neither the messages nor their association can be repudiated. Ford and Baum [330] discuss SET and the supporting infrastructure. Ghosh [353] provides a balanced view of the dangers of Internet commerce using the Web.