9.8. Exercises
| 1: | Reconsider the case of Alice and her stockbroker, Bob. Suppose they decide not to use a session key. Instead, Alice pads the message (BUY or SELL) with random data. Explain under what conditions this approach would be effective. Discuss how the length of the block affects your answer. | | 2: | Modify Kohnfelder's scheme (see page 131) to allow a principal to issue its own certificate. Identify one or more problems other principals might have in relying on such a certificate. In particular, under what conditions would this solve the problem of an imposter spoofing the sender? | | 3: | An X.509 certificate revocation list contains a field specifying when the next such list is expected to be issued. Why is that field present? | | 4: | Consider the following authentication protocol, which uses a classical cryptosystem. Alice generates a random message r, enciphers it with the key k she shares with Bob, and sends the enciphered message {r}k to Bob. Bob deciphers it, adds 1 to r, and sends {r + 1}k back to Alice. Alice deciphers the message and compares it with r. If the difference is 1, she knows that her correspondent shares the same key k and is therefore Bob. If not, she assumes that her correspondent does not share the key k and so is not Bob. Does this protocol authenticate Bob to Alice? Why or why not? | | 5: | Needham and Schroeder suggest the following variant of their protocol:
Alice Bob :
Alice
Bob Alice :
{ Alice, rand3 } kBob
Alice Cathy :
{ Alice, Bob, rand1, { Alice, rand3 } kBob }
Cathy Alice :
{ Alice, Bob, rand1, ksession, {Alice, rand3, ksession} kBob } kAlice
Alice Bob :
{ Alice, rand3, ksession } kBob
Bob Alice :
{ rand2 } ksession
Alice Bob :
{ rand2 1 }ksession
Show that this protocol solves the problem of replay as a result of stolen session keys. | | 6: | Consider an RSA digital signature scheme (see Section 9.5.2). Alice tricks Bob into signing messages m1 and m2 such that m = m1m2 mod nBob. Prove that Alice can forge Bob's signature on m. | | 7: | Return to the example on page 140. Bob and Alice agree to sign the contract G (06). This time, Alice signs the message first and then enciphers the result. Show that the attack Bob used when Alice enciphered the message and then signed it will now fail. |
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